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THE ART OF CHRISTIAN ATHEISM: FAITH AND 
PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY HEIDEGGER 
James K. A. Smith 
In his early work, Martin Heidegger argues for a rigorous methodological 
atheism in philosophy, which is not opposed to religious faith but only to 
the impact of faith when one is philosophizing. For the young Heidegger, 
the philosopher, even though possibly a religious person, must be an atheist 
when doing philosophy. Christian philosophy, then, is a round square. In 
this essay, I unpack Heidegger's methodological considerations and 
attempt to draw parallels with other traditions which argue for the possibil-
ity of a Christian philosophy but at root concede Heidegger's atheism. In 
conclusion, I propose that it is precisely Heidegger's work which points to 
the inescapabiIity of and opens the door to religious philosophy. 
Christian atheism is a little old now, rather passe, perhaps even modem 
(which, ironically, now means confined to the past-no longer contem-
porary). As John A.T. Robinson, Thomas J.J. Altizer and William 
Hamilton attempted to demonstrate, the God of theism-the God of 
metaphysics-is a false god, an idol which has nothing to do with the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or the God and Father of Jesus of 
Nazareth.' This atheism does not concern the "existence" of God but 
rather the priority of Being and metaphysics when it comes to speaking 
of God. As Jean-Luc Marion has suggested, "God is, exists, and that is 
the least of things. At issue here is not the possiblity of God's attaining 
to Being, but, quite the opposite, the possibility of Being's attaining to 
God."2 And in this regard, I too must confess that I am not a theist, that I 
am a Christian a-theist; but in so doing, I consider myself to be a good 
disciple, following the Galilean who knew nothing of theism, who was 
himself a good a-theist. (Nevertheless, a number of Christians persist in 
their theism, and a number of Christian philosophers continue to delude 
themselves by thinking that theistic philosophy is Christian.) 
However, the idea of a Christian atheism is older than perhaps we 
have supposed. As I will attempt to show, a similar yet distinct notion is 
uncovered in the early lectures of Martin Heidegger from 1919-23, draw-
ing on even earlier precedents. But Heidegger's Christian atheism is dif-
ferent than the death of God theologians: his Christian atheist is a 
philosopher, one who has a knack for being both a philosopher and a 
Christian, which means being both an atheist and yet religious. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 14 No.1 January 1997 
All rights reserved 
71 
72 Faith and Philosophy 
Heidegger was not concerned about the idea of a theistic philosophy 
(which he would have seen as simply an instantiation of the Western 
metaphysical tradition), but rather about the very possibility of 
Christian philosophy, the possibility of a philosopher having faith when 
philosophizing. While the first form of Christian a-theism is marked by 
the refusal to equate the God of Abraham and the God of metaphysics, 
the Christian atheism of Heidegger is concerned with excluding faith 
from philosophy, keeping philosophy pure from such contaminations. 
Now, while I would confess that I am a Christian a-theist, I would at 
the same time confess that I am a Christian philosopher. And so here I 
am (me voici), between South Bend and Freiburg, an a-theist Christian 
philosopher, soliciting the ire of both theists and atheists. In this paper, I 
won't be taking on the theists (which is always a rather hazardous pro-
ject, opposing these ones with theos on their side); rather I will focus on 
Heidegger's critique. Rather than concluding with Heidegger that it is 
impossible for the philosopher to believe, I will propose that it is impos-
sible for the philosopher not to believe, and that such a conclusion is one 
that is required by Heidegger's very own hermeneutic phenomenology. 
Philosophy, Atheism and Faith 
Though we will hear about Heidegger's insistence on atheism, the 
young Freiburg lecturer was by no means opposed to religion or faith. 
As Hugo Ott, Theodore Kisiel, and John van Buren have recently shown, 
it was precisely his Christian faith (first Catholic and then Protestant) 
which was the impetus for his early philosophical breakthroughs.3 What 
is at stake, then, is the relationship between faith and philosophy, and it 
is here that Heidegger preaches atheism. For instance, in 
Wintersemester 1921/22, Heidegger insisted: 
Questioningness [Fraglichkeit] is not religious, but it may never-
theless lead me to a position where I must make a religious deci-
sion. I do not behave religiously in philosophizing, even if I as a 
philosopher can be a religious man. "But here is the art": to phi-
losophize and thereby to be genuinely religious, i.e., to take up 
factically its worldly, historical task in philosophizing, in action 
and a world of action, not in religious ideology and fantasy. 
Philosophy, in its radical self-positing questioningness, must 
be in principle a theistic.4 
Philosophy is radical questioning; but to really question-to push one's 
questioning to the brink of the abyss-one must be an atheist, for faith 
gives answers too soon. Even into the next decade, in 1935, Heidegger 
maintained this principle of methodological atheism, arguing that 
Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has 
the answer to the question, "Why are there essents rather than 
nothing?" even before it is asked: everything that is, except God 
himself, has been created by Him .... One who holds to such a 
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faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question, but 
he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and 
taking all of the consequences of such a step. He will only be 
able to act 'as if ... s 
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Faith and philosophy, according to Heidegger (who was only follow-
ing in the footsteps of Paul and Martin Luther6), are "mortal enemies." 
In fact, "[fJaith is so absolutely the mortal enemy that philosophy does 
not even begin to want in any way to do battle with it."7 "The philoso-
pher does not believe,"B cannot believe, because faith is in radical oppo-
sition to the very nature of philosophy as questioning. If philosophy is 
going to "make factical life speak for itself" it must be "fundamentally 
atheistic."9 That is why the idea of a 'Christian philosophy' is a "square 
circle" and a "round square."HI 
It may be a legitimate question to ask how much this opposing of 
faith and philosophy owes to Heidegger's unfortunate experiences as a 
"Catholic philosopher,"!! for it was after these experiences that perhaps 
the earliest glimpse of this disjunction is uncovered. In a 1919 letter to 
his long-time mentor, Engelbert Krebs, the young Heidegger explains 
that he must give up his faith to fulfil his calling to be a philosopher. 
"The past two years," he begins, 
in which I have sought to clarify my basic theological position, 
putting aside every special academic assignment in order to do 
so, have led me to conclusions for which, had I been constrained 
by extraphilosophical allegiances, I could not have guaranteed 
the necessary independence of conviction and doctrine.12 
Philosophy cannot be contained by extra-philosophical allegiances, such 
as faith, and that is why good philosophers need to be atheists, at least 
when they are doing philosophy. 
When Heidegger asserts that philosophy must be 'methodologically 
atheistic,' he is not simply saying that philosophy shouldn't be theistic, 
that it should not be tied to metaphysics (as I would agree); rather, his 
emphasis is that philosophy is not religious and cannot be such. The 
philosopher does not believe-period. It is not a debate about the object 
or content of faith, but rather the absence of faith in philosophy. 
Heidegger's Thomism? 
It seems to me that I have heard something like this before, not from 
an apostate but from a good Catholic. For is not this notion of a pure, 
faith-free philosophy a very Thomistic idea? Do we not hear similar 
rumblings from Paris in the thirteenth century? Did not the Angelic 
Doctor himself insist that philosophy is the domain of natural, unaided, 
human reason and that faith is left to theology?13 Isn't Heidegger's 
philosophical atheism actually an indicator of his Thomism? While nei-
ther Thomas nor Thomists ever insisted on methodological atheism in 
philosophy, the understanding of the nature of philosophy in the 
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Thomist tradition betrays an interesting parallel with Heidegger. And 
this is true of both the "manual tradition" of Thomism and the neo-
Thomism of Gilson and company, even though the Gilsonian tradition 
will insist on using the term "Christian philosophy." Let me explain the 
analogy between these opposing schools before comparing both to early 
Heidegger. 
A recent essay by Jude Dougherty is representative of a long tradition 
of Catholic philosophers. For Dougherty, the idea of a "Christian philos-
ophy" is an oxymoron-like a square circle-because philosophy which 
is influenced by revelation is no longer (good) philosophy; that is, "phi-
losophy must remain unalloyed if it is to be true philosophy. It must 
justify to its hearer every conclusion it reaches by the evidence it pro-
duces and the inferences it makes."14 Or as Joseph Owens expounds this 
tradition (commenting from a Gilsonian perspective): 
Philosophy grounded its reasoning on naturally acceptable start-
ing points. It could not make use of revealed truth as premises 
for demonstrations. In consequence it could not permit itself to 
be specified by anything that was given through divine revela-
tion. In this traditional setting no philosophy seemed amenable 
to designation by the notion "Christian," as many modern writ-
ers viewed the situation. Hence arose the stand that there can no 
more be a Christian philosophy than there could be a Christian 
mathematics or a Christian chemistry.15 
While these philosophers are not atheists, neither are they Christians, 
when they philosophize. For both Dougherty and Heidegger, faith is 
excluded from philosophy. This does not, however, exclude God from 
philosophy, for Dougherty; rather,it is precisely the God of meta-
physics-the god of theism-who appears in "true" philosophy. 
But interestingly, even Gilson's conception of the relationship 
between faith and philosophy retains in essence the heart of Heidegger's 
critique. For while Gilson would insist on using the term "Christian phi-
losophy," faith remains extrinsic to philosophy. Faith only makes sug-
gestions for research projects16; once that theme is taken up, the philoso-
pher is engaged in an activity that is shielded from the influence of faith. 
Christian faith provides clues to "naturally knowable starting points" 
that are pursued by the philosopher (the most famous, of course, being 
Exodus 3:14), but once philosophy proper begins, Christian faith steps 
aside. "The result," Owens concludes, "is that on such a basis an entire 
philosophy may be specified as Christian, even though nothing specifi-
cally Christian enters into its reasoning process .... [T]he path itself 
remains extrinsic to the strictly philosophical discourse."17 In essence, 
this conception is in agreement with Heidegger insofar as philosophy 
proper remains untainted by faith. 
I have detoured into the Thomist tradition in order to point out strik-
ing analogies with Heidegger and to suggest a source for Heidegger's 
insistence on methodological atheism. Heidegger's strong Catholic 
roots are well known by now, as well as his affinity with and interest in 
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Scholastic philosophy. In addition, his work on the Habilitationschrift 
was funded by a grant from the 'Constantin and Olga von Schaezler 
Foundation in honour of St. Thomas Aquinas,' which was secured by 
Heidegger's application in which he confessed: "The obedient under-
signed intends to devote himself to the study of Christian philosophy 
and to embark on an academic career."IS Ten years later, Heidegger 
would reject the notion of Christian philosophy as a "square circle" and 
rather insist on atheism. But was this such a momentous shift as some 
have assumed? As we have seen, the understanding of philosophy in 
the Thomist tradition is analogous, if not identical, to Heidegger's defin-
ition: both assert that faith remains extrinsic to philosophy qua philoso-
phy. And this remains true despite the very different results of such 
similar methodologies. In the Thomist tradition, pure philosophy can 
still deliver God, the God of metaphysics, known by natural reason; as 
such, Thomism is a theism. For Heidegger, however, 'God' could never 
appear in philosophy, would never 'show' her/his face as a phenome-
non; thus philosophy excludes not only faith but also God. 
This conception of the relationship between faith and philosophy is 
not confined to neo-Scholastic Catholics; it can also be locateed in con-
temporary discussions, as seen, for instance, in the work of Jean-Luc 
Marion. A rigorous critic of metaphysics and its god, Marion has recent-
ly insisted on God outside/without Being (sans l'etre). However, God 
still appears in his phenomenology as a phenomenon which saturates 
our intention and aiml9-God still shows his face in philosophy as phe-
nomenology. Nevertheless, the God of phenomenology must still be 
distinguished from the "God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob" inas-
much as God appears only as a "possibility" in phenomenology. 
Phenomenology can identify the saturated phenomenon, but it is the 
role of faith to name such as God. "Reason-here philosophy in its phe-
nomenological bearing" -must eventually yield to faith, to revealed the-
ology. And one must be vigilant, Marion asserts, not to confuse phe-
nomenology (reason) and revealed theology (faith).2n 
Finally, the same boundary may be found in a deconstructionist 
Catholic philosopher such as John Caputo. Though Caputo has no 
investments in Thomism (though the tradition is certainly part of his 
development), a similar framework seems to emerge in his work. 
Reflecting on the possibility of Christian philosophy today, Caputo is 
"struck by the openings that postmodern thinking creates for Christian 
philosophy today."21 But again, the relationship between Christian faith 
and philosophy is extrinsic to the act of philosophizing. As Caputo 
defines the term, Christian philosophy means "thinking philosophically 
within the context and the framework of the New Testament ... .! suggest 
we hear the expression 'Christian philosophy' the way we hear expres-
sions like 'Greek philosophy' or 'French philosophy,' as indicative of a 
certain style, a certain idiom ... "22 I think Gilson would agree: philosophy 
is philosophy, and faith has nothing to do with it, even though it may 
provide a style or idiom. 
For Caputo, then, philosophy proper is shielded from faith; thus a 
philosopher can only say so much. Eventually philosophy meets its 
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match, its limit or horizon, and only faith can step beyond. For instance, 
in his commentary on Levinas, Caputo concludes that philosophically we 
cannot say who calls: Il or il y a. The one calling remains anonymous, 
and this anonymity is the horizon of faith. 23 Philosophically, we cannot 
say whether Nietzsche or Kierkegaard is right-such a decision lies 
beyond philosophy, and the realm of faith.24 When I philosophize, I am 
an atheist, because philosophy is inevitably and necessarily 'Greek,' and 
by definition excludes the religious, the 'Hebrew.' 
Evidently, then, Heidegger's notion of methodological atheism is a 
rather popular one, though it is never explicitly described as such by 
others.2s As I have attempted to demonstrate, the relationship of faith 
and philosophy receives similar treatment in philosophers ranging from 
Gilson to Caputo. It may be safe to say, in fact, that very few disagree 
with Heidegger's critique, including those that espouse a "Christian phi-
10sophy."26 For Heidegger would also concede that Christian philoso-
phy may be a sociological category;27 but when he discusses the impos-
sibility of Christian philosophy, he refers to the unalloyed nature of phi-
losophy which even good Thomists would agree on (though, it must be 
emphasized, their results are markedly different). 
Demythologizing Heidegger 
But is philosophy so pure? Is not the notion of an autonomous phi-
losophy precisely the demon that Heidegger's own work was engaged 
in battling? Was it not Heidegger who insisted on the role of presuppo-
sitions and preunderstanding in philosophy? Is not this excising of faith 
from Dasein akin to the reduction to a transcendental-logical ego, the 
animal that Heidegger declared to be mythical? Can I stop believing 
when I philosophize? Do I? 
It is here that I would like to propose that Heidegger, when dis-
cussing faith and philosophy, draws back from where the trajectory of 
his own thought would lead. The whole of Heidegger's early work is 
bent on demonstrating that we are not disembodied egos, but rather 
human be-ings (Dasein) who are in the world, and who cannot extrapo-
late ourselves outside of that environment (Umwelt). We are in-der-Welt-
seirz, as embodied, historical, situated beings. We are here (Da), now, 
and such is a condition for my knowing anything. We cannot step out-
side of our skin or transcend our finitude. Hans-Georg Gadamer carried 
on this work in his philosophical hermeneutics, insisting that we cannot 
know apart from bias, despite all of the Enlightenment protests to the 
contrary. In fact, this Enlightenment critique of prejudice is itself a prej-
udice and must be owned up as such. Weare effected by our history 
and tradition.28 
Philosophy, then, is not a pure, unalloyed, transcendental science, 
though it is a theoretical discipline (Wissenschaft). But as Heidegger's 
own work demonstrates, theory is not free from prejudice, from "extra-
philosophical" influences-a point which has been demonstrated in a 
number of arenas since Heidegger: Thomas Kuhn, for instance, pointed 
to the paradigms or frameworks of belief which direct the sciences. Of 
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special interest here is the fact that throughout his landmark study, 
Kuhn uses the language of faith to describe the relationship between 
paradigms and science: words such as "conversion," "belief," and "com-
mitment,"29 signalling that there is a commitment which precedes theo-
retical work and which makes that theoretical work possible.30 
The work of Gadamer, Ricouer, Kuhn, and Polanyi-all of which 
points to the influence of 'extra-philosophical' commitments-is all 
dependent, directly or indirectly, on the insights of the early Heidegger 
as crystallized in Being and Time. And yet, it is precisely this young 
Heidegger who insists on excluding the influence of faith from philoso-
phy. Do we not find at this juncture a vestige of Enlightenment rational-
ism in the work of this one who played such a pivotal role in its disman-
tlement?3! Would not a more insistent hermeneutic phenomenology 
honor the role played by faith in philosophizing? Research in this century 
has demonstrated that philosophy (and all theory) is conditioned by pre-
vious commitments which not only provide starting points (as in the 
Gilsonian tradition), but make philosophy possible. Whether these pre-
vious commitments are described as worldviews (Jaspers), paradigms 
(Kuhn), final vocabularies (Rorty), prejudices (Gadamer), or forehavings 
(Heidegger), they all refer to beliefs which are constitutive of human 
knowing, and as such, philosophy. 
Perhaps what theorists in this century have not yet appreciated is the 
religious nature of these commitments. Because of certain twists and 
turns in the history of Western philosophy (and Christianity) "faith" has 
been confined to largely 'institutional' commitments and reduced to 
something like 'propositional assent to' some doctrine. As such, faith 
became defined by its content or object. I am proposing a retrieval of a 
broader meaning of pistis (and pisteuo) as trust or commitment. The 
result of this broadening is two-fold: first, faith is no longer determined 
by the object or content of the commitment but rather as the commitment 
itself. Any fundamental, grounding commitment (which is not itself 
grounded) may be legitimately described as a faith, which is simply to 
say that pistis may be translated many ways. A second implication of 
this retrieval is the correlative broadening of the notion of "religion" as 
simply a commitment to and trust in something 'ultimate' which cannot 
be rationally proven, but rather stands at the beginning of all reason and 
theory?2 That which is believed is not argued to but argued from. "If I 
have exhausted the justifications," Wittgenstein commented," I have 
reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say, 
'this is simply what I do."'33 For my purposes here, it is not primarily a 
question of what someone is trusting but that someone is committed 
before theory, before reason. 
When Heidegger argues for methodological atheism when doing phi-
losophy, he is really asserting that faith plays no role in philosophizing. 
But given that intention, must we not ask: Is atheism religiously neutral? 
Is the atheist without faith? Does not the atheist also have extra-philo-
sophical commitments, beliefs which give the answer too soon, undoing 
the nature of philosophy as radical questioning? Does not this religious-
ly neutral philosopher hang out with Descartes' bodiless cogito and rub 
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shoulders with Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological ego, in a 
mythical world of purity? 
Could it be that faith is inescapable? It is this scandalous thesis which 
I think has not yet been fully grasped, though the path has been cleared 
in recent years by emergence of postmodernism. It is postmodernism, 
and (perhaps surprisingly) deconstruction in particular, which signals 
the religious character of philosophy, for as Alan Olson has proposed, 
"it may be that the deconstructive mood of postmodernity is faith-
inspired-even faith-obsessed in an obscure sort of way."34 Faith- com-
mitment, trust-is that which makes theory (and philosophy) possible. 
Not that every philosopher will attend church or synagogue; but every 
philosopher will and must operate with an ultimate trust which makes 
philosophy possible. Philosophy is inescapably religious, but that is not 
to say that Athens is covertly Jerusalem, or that the 'Hebrew' necessarily 
infiltrates the 'Greek.' Greece, one must recall, had its own religion. 
This is seen, for instance, in Derrida's insistent questioning of the 
question in Of Spirit, a work haunted by ghosts, in which we catch 
glimpse of a spectre (let us say, l'esprit) lurking beneath and behind 
Derrida's corpus, his body (0£ writings). This spirit is conjured up not at 
Endor but in a telling note: a note, offered as a pledge, on the origins of 
language as a promise. In a passage hovering between commentary and 
autobiography, he remarks: 
It remains to find out whether this Versprechen is not the 
promise which, opening every speaking, makes possible the 
very question and therefore precedes it without belonging to it: 
the dissymmetry of an affirmation, of a yes before all opposition 
of yes and no .... Language always, before any question, and in the 
very question, comes down to the promise. This would also be 
a promise of spirit.35 
The note follows on the heels of this passage as an attempt to under-
stand this unexpected visitation of (the) spirit. Here we are directed to 
an "originaryallegiance" or "commitment" which precedes every ques-
tioning, before any distinction between yes and no; that is, one begins by 
trusting a promise, a commitment before the word, a "wordless word 
which we name the 'yes'."'" That is why "[plarole must first pray, 
address itself to us: put in us its trust, its confidence, depend on us, and 
even have already done it."37 And this pledge, he continues, this 
'already,' is essential because it reaches back to a moment of already-
having-trusted, an older event, part of a past which never returns, and 
never 'was.' This analysis strikes at the very heart of the Heideggerian 
notion of methodological atheism by positing a commitment before the 
question, for it was precisely the radical "questioningness" [Fraglichkeit] 
of philosophy which he felt called for atheism in philosophy. 
Conclusion: Rounding the Square 
I have attempted to expound Heidegger's notion of "methodological 
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atheism" as well as its parallels and analogies in Thomistic systems, sug-
gesting that the parallels are not merely coincidental but perhaps indi-
cate a common source. 
Oeconstructively, I have argued that Heidegger's insistence on faith-
free philosophy is impossible, given his own dismantling of the 
Enlightenment tradition and development of hermeneutical thought, as 
well as later contributions by Gadamer, Kuhn and Polanyi. Rather than 
agreeing that "the philosopher does not believe," I would assert that the 
philosopher can't help but believe. Oerrida suggests the same in his 
Memoirs of the Blind. "Do you believe?" an interlocutor asks. "I don't 
know," someone responds, "one has to be/ieve ... "38 It is inescapable: one 
must (il faut) be committed, give credence, have faith (croire). 
Constructively, this means that the circle is not so square after all. 
Rather than being mortal enemies (Heidegger), nor extrinsic to one 
another (Gilson, Caputo), faith and philosophy are inextricably linked, 
opening the door for the development of a Christian philosophy (and 
not only the possibility of a Christian philosophy, but the religious 
nature of philosophy itself). And it is precisely in the context of post-
modern and deconstructionist discourse that an avenue is opened for 
such work, because it is in this context that the role of commitment in all 
theory is recognized. 
Of course, I will continue to insist that Christian philosophy remain 
atheistic; not in the sense of being without faith, but in the sense of 
rejecting the idol of theism. And that is still a bit of an art. 
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